A Bargaining Theory of US-China Economic Rivalry: Differentiating the Trade and Technology Wars
Forthcoming at the Chinese Journal of International Politics
Previously titled "Uncertainty vs. Prevention: Understanding the Trade and Technology Wars in US-China Relations
This article examines the outbreak and persistence of US-China economic war, which comprises both the trade war, featured with retaliatory tariffs, and the technology war, featured with restrictions on Chinese access to US technologies. Building on the analytical framework of bargaining and war, I argue that different components of the economic war emerged from distinct causes. The outbreak of the trade war was primarily driven by the information problem, characterized by mutual uncertainty and the lack of effective communications. The technology war was largely a result of the commitment problem driven by the existing power’s concern regarding potential future changes in the balance of power. After examining the initiation stage during the Trump era, I further analyze how the economic war has unfolded during the Biden administration. While the prospect of a new trade war seems unlikely as mutual uncertainty diminishes, existing tariffs remain as the commitment problem on trade issues has become more critical. The preventive technology war is expected to persist, reflecting Washington’s ongoing concerns over China’s growing leadership in technology.
Previously titled "Uncertainty vs. Prevention: Understanding the Trade and Technology Wars in US-China Relations
This article examines the outbreak and persistence of US-China economic war, which comprises both the trade war, featured with retaliatory tariffs, and the technology war, featured with restrictions on Chinese access to US technologies. Building on the analytical framework of bargaining and war, I argue that different components of the economic war emerged from distinct causes. The outbreak of the trade war was primarily driven by the information problem, characterized by mutual uncertainty and the lack of effective communications. The technology war was largely a result of the commitment problem driven by the existing power’s concern regarding potential future changes in the balance of power. After examining the initiation stage during the Trump era, I further analyze how the economic war has unfolded during the Biden administration. While the prospect of a new trade war seems unlikely as mutual uncertainty diminishes, existing tariffs remain as the commitment problem on trade issues has become more critical. The preventive technology war is expected to persist, reflecting Washington’s ongoing concerns over China’s growing leadership in technology.
2021. "Same as the Old Boss?: How Domestic Politics Affects Turnover-induced Information Traps," with Amanda Licht and Scott Wolford. International Studies Quarterly 65(1): 173-183.
Leadership turnover brings to office new leaders with private reputational incentives to bluff about their resolve, incentivizing both incumbents and their foreign rivals to take steps that increase the risk of war. Some leader changes, however, are more dangerous than others. The turnover trap arises when there is sufficient uncertainty about a new leader’s resolve and expectations of future interactions, and whether those factors coincide depends on how new leaders come to power and the political system in which its turnover occurs. We expect that those instances of leader change most likely to generate turnover traps entail (1) democratic incumbents unconnected to their predecessor’s support coalition and (2) autocratic incumbents that inherit their predecessors’ coalitions. In a sample of strategic rivals from 1918-2007, we find that the probability of dispute escalation declines over leaders’ tenure, but only for the two types of turnover we identify as most dangerous.
mentioned by Public Radio International's The World
mentioned by Public Radio International's The World
2018. "Leaders, States, Reputations," with Scott Wolford. Journal of Conflict Resolution 62(10): 2087-2117
[.pdf] [appendix]
Reputational incentives are ubiquitous explanations for war, yet consistent evidence of their effects is elusive for two reasons. First, most work searches for the payment of reputational costs, yet strategic censoring systematically biases observational data against revealing them. Second, the locus of reputation is often ambiguous, yet the choice of leader or state as unit of observation has inferential consequences. Our research design (a) focuses on observable implications of reputational theories in appropriate samples and (b) considers two competing sources of reputational incentives: changes in national leaders and in political institutions. Consistent with our expectations, leadership turnover and regime change are each associated with initially high probabilities that militarized disputes escalate to the use of force before declining over time in the presence of a reasonable expectation of future disputes. Reputations are in evidence, but analysts must look for them in the right place.
Untying Hands after Public Threats: Signaling Domestic Preferences in International Crisis Bargaining
Working paper
Why do leaders make a threat more or less salient to a public in international crises? The literature on costly signaling in crises debates on whether open threats allow democratic leaders to signal resolve, or the willingness to fight. Given the wide coverage of foreign affairs, however, all threats are more or less open and complete secrecy is rare. A more useful distinction is whether leaders make an existing threat more or less salient to a public. I develop a game-theoretic model to examine how a leader chooses the salience of an existing threat to signal the public's resolve to a foreign adversary. The new distinction yields two important findings on the strategy of democratic leaders. First, when the public is dovish, a democratic leader makes a threat more salient, revealing that the public is unwilling to fight and thus leading to peace. Second, when the public is hawkish, a democratic leader can make a threat more salient, that is, mimic the strategy of a leader faced with a dovish public, keeping the adversary uninformed and thus leading to war. Regardless of the crisis outcomes, the democratic leader follows the public's policy preference. The result shows that raising the salience of an existing threat can lead to peace not by deterring an adversary, but by signaling a preference for peace. It also explains why leaders are sometimes not punished by the public after backing down from a highly salient threat.
Why do leaders make a threat more or less salient to a public in international crises? The literature on costly signaling in crises debates on whether open threats allow democratic leaders to signal resolve, or the willingness to fight. Given the wide coverage of foreign affairs, however, all threats are more or less open and complete secrecy is rare. A more useful distinction is whether leaders make an existing threat more or less salient to a public. I develop a game-theoretic model to examine how a leader chooses the salience of an existing threat to signal the public's resolve to a foreign adversary. The new distinction yields two important findings on the strategy of democratic leaders. First, when the public is dovish, a democratic leader makes a threat more salient, revealing that the public is unwilling to fight and thus leading to peace. Second, when the public is hawkish, a democratic leader can make a threat more salient, that is, mimic the strategy of a leader faced with a dovish public, keeping the adversary uninformed and thus leading to war. Regardless of the crisis outcomes, the democratic leader follows the public's policy preference. The result shows that raising the salience of an existing threat can lead to peace not by deterring an adversary, but by signaling a preference for peace. It also explains why leaders are sometimes not punished by the public after backing down from a highly salient threat.